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    Appellant challenges the December 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant shooting the victim to death, 
and dumping the body elsewhere. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary 
and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory 
factors. 2) the Board penalized the appellant for maintaining his claim of innocence. 3) the Board 
failed to list facts in support of the statutory standard cited. 4) the decision lacked detail. 5) the 
decision was based upon penal philosophy. 6) concealing a corpse is not an escalation of his 
criminal history. 7) he was not evasive during the interview. 8) the decision illegally resentenced 
him. 9) community opposition and DA opposition are not allowed, and the FOIL request to obtain 
these documents was illegally denied. 10)  the decision violated the due process clause of the 
constitution. 11) the COMPAS was ignored.  
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also 
considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor 
considered.  Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 
(3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 
A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017);Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 
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50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017).   
  The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal 
behavior.  See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of 
Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 
N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 
A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).    
    The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
   The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
  Credibility of an inmates explanation is to be made by the Board. The Board may consider the 
inmate’s capacity to tell the truth, and how this impacts on the statutory factors. Siao-Pao v 
Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept. 2008). Several of appellant’s answers to 
questions were short or evasive.  
   The Board may consider the probable repercussions of the criminal’s actions upon the victims’ 
families. Bottom v New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 657, 815 N.Y.S.2d 789  (3d Dept. 
2006). 
   Once an individual has been convicted of a crime, it is generally not the Board’s role to reevaluate 
a claim of innocence. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000);  
Copeland v New York State Board of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d Dept. 2017). 
But the Board did not punish the inmate for this claim.  
  The escalation of criminal history referred to the murder conviction, so it was not in error. 
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   That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole would not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
  The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory 
factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); 
accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The 2011 
amendments did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply 
when deciding whether to grant parole, namely (1) whether “there is a reasonable probability that, 
if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law”; (2) whether 
release “is not incompatible with the welfare of society”; and (3) whether release “will not so 
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deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A).Even uniformly low COMPAS scores and other evidence of rehabilitation would not 
resolve the broader questions of society’s welfare, public perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, 
or whether release would undermine respect for the law.  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a 
particular result, and declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 
amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The 
COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors 
for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. 
State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of 
Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014). 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
  Community opposition was not cited as a factor in the Board decision, though DA opposition 
was. As appellant made his request through FOIL, that is a matter that is outside the scope o fthe 
jurisdiction of the Appeals Unit. In any event, an inmate has no constitutional right to the 
information in his parole file, including the pre-sentence investigation report and the confidential 
section of the Parole Board report. Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d 
Cir. 1976). An inmate does not have automatic access to confidential material. Matter of Perez v 
New York State Division of Parole,  294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dept 2002);  
Macklin v Travis, 274 A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 2000). The Board may 
consider the confidential section to the Inmate Status Report/Parole Board Report is permissible. 
Molinar v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214, 991 N.Y.S.2d 487 (3d Dept. 
2014). Per Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(B), items submitted to the Parole Board are deemed to be 
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confidential. Per Executive Law 259-k(2) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a)(b), the Parole 
Board is entitled to designate certain parole records as confidential. Wade v Stanford, 148 
A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). 
    Pursuant to Executive Law §259-k and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8000.5 et. seq.,  parole records are 
deemed to be confidential. Thus, per Public Officers Law §87(2)(b) they are exempt from 
disclosure on the grounds on confidentiality, invasion of privacy, and the possibility they could 
endanger the life and safety of a person-even if redacted. Zarvela v New York State Division of 
Parole, 252 A.D.2d 714, 675 N.Y.S.2d 917 (3d Dept. 1998); Collins v New York State Division 
of Parole, 251 A.D.2d 738, 674 A.D.2d 145 (3d Dept. 1998), lv. den. 92 N.Y.2d 811, 680 N.Y.S.2d 
457; Robles v Tracy, 275 A.D.2d 837, 713 N.Y.S.2d 777 (3d Dept. 2000); Carty v New York State 
Division of Parole, 277 A.D.2d 633, 716 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (3d Dept. 2000).     An inmate has no 
right to the letter from the District Attorney to the Parole Board, and it falls within a FOIL 
exemption from disclosure. Grigger v New York State Division of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 783 
N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dept. 2004);  Matter of Ramahlo v Bruno, 273 A.D.2d 521, 708 N.Y.S.2d 206 
(3d Dept. 2000)  lv. den. 95 N.Y.2d 767 (2000); Mingo v New York State Division of Parole, 244 
A.D.2d 781, 666 N.Y.S.2d 245 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     As for community opposition, the Board may receive and consider written communications from 
individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an 
inmate’s release to parole supervision.  Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 
A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018) (“Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do 
not find that [the Board’s] consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent community opposition’ 
to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors that may be taken into 
account in rendering a parole release determination”), appeal dismissed, 2019 N.Y. LEXIS 
622 (Mar. 28, 2019); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 
134 (1st Dept. 2018) (“the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole 
application submitted by public officials and members of the community”); Matter of Grigger v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) 
(recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)’s list is not the exclusive information the Board may consider and 
persons in addition to victims and their families may submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 
N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d 
Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens are protected and remain confidential); Matter of Rivera v. 
Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda 
A.J.S.C.) (recognizing “[c]onsideration of community or other opposition was proper under the 
statute” and the Board is required to keep identity of persons opposing release confidential), aff’d 
sub nom. Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter 
of Hamilton v. New York State Bd. of Parole, Index # 3699-2013, Order and Judgment dated 
October 25, 2013 (Devine J.S.C.)(Albany Co. Court)(no showing of prejudice by allegedly false 
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information in PBA online petition where Board acknowledged public opposition during interview), 
aff’d, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); cf. Krebs v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 
No. 9:08-CV-255NAMDEP, 2009 WL 2567779, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) (public and 
political pressure “are permissible factors which parole officials may properly consider as they 
relate to ‘whether ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate 
the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law’”); Morel v. Thomas, No. 02 CV 
9622 (HB), 2003 WL 21488017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2003) (same); Seltzer v. Thomas, No. 
03 CIV.00931 LTS FM, 2003 WL 21744084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (same).   The same 
has also long been recognized as true with respect to letters supporting an inmate’s potential parole 
release.  See, e.g., Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1273, 990 
N.Y.S.2d at 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 
N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (4th Dept. 2005); Matter of Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 
A.D.2d 128, 129, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept. 2002); Matter of Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 
360, 362, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1st Dept. 1998); cf. Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 371, 
830 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1st Dept. 2007) (Board permissibly determined offense outweighed other 
positive factors including letters of support from, among others, victim’s mother).  Indeed, 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2) refers to the security of letters either in support of or in opposition to 
an inmate’s release.   
  Mention should also be made that the policy being urged by appellant would be unconstitutional. 
It is a binding principle that New York courts must avoid, if possible, interpreting a presumptively 
valid statute in such a manner that would needlessly render it to be unconstitutional. Alliance of 
American Insurers v Chu, 77 N.Y.2d 573, 585, 569 N.Y.S.364 (1991); Lavalle v Hayden, 98 
N.Y.2d 155, 161, 746 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2002). Per the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no 
law … prohibiting  the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.”  The right of petition found in the First Amendment is one of the 
freedoms protected by the Bills of Rights, and the courts cannot impute to the Legislature an intent 
to invade these freedoms. This philosophy governs the approach of groups of citizens  to 
administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive).  
Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the government. Calififornia Motor 
Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed2d 642 (1972).   The 
courts should refrain from adopting such an unconstitutional interpretation. If the Appeals Unit 
were to adopt the approach advocated by appellant, it is basically rendering the First Amendment 
as being meaningless by ordering  the Parole Board not to entertain constitutionally authorized 
activity.  
    The Parole Board decision doesn’t contain any penal law philosophy. And, by way of analogy, 
victim impact statements may contain raw emotions of a close-knit family traumatized by a 
depraved and senseless murder. These submissions can also be emotional and touch upon 
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inappropriate matters.  Such fact does not require the Parole Board to expressly disavow in its 
decision inappropriate matters interjected by victims or to somehow quantify the extent or degree  
to which it considered appropriate parts of victim’s statements while disregarding other parts in its 
overall analysis of the statutory factors. The Board’s decision will be upheld if there is nothing 
indicating it was influenced by, placed weigh upon, or relied upon any improper matter. Duffy v 
New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207, 19 
N.Y.S.3d 610 (3d Dept. 2015). 
   An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of 
a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
of Motti v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 114, 115, 863 N.Y.S.2d 839, 839-40 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of 
Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d Dept. 
2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
   Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
